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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
IN DISTRICT COURT
The

Supreme

Court

of

the

State

of

Utah

has

jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Constitution
Article VIII, section 4, and Utah Code Ann. sec. 78-2-2(3)(j).
The proceedings below consist of plaintiffs1
action seeking:

class

(1) an order of the court enjoining defendant

(the "Board") from enforcing the Board's order of January 19,
1988 (the "Order"),
of

plaintiffs

and

or otherwise preventing certain children
other

students

similarly

situated

from

attending the high school of their choice or closest to their
places of residence in the Salt Lake City School District (the
"District"), after taking into account school capacities and
natural

physical

barriers;

determining that the Order

(2)

a

declaratory

judgment

is void and of no effect because

the Order is unconstitutional and is ultra vires the powers of
the Board/ (3) an order of the court directing notice to the
Board of the particulars in which the Order violates the Utah
Constitution and exceeds the powers of the Board as granted by
the statutes of the State of Utah, and giving the Board a
reasonable opportunity

to rescind

the Order

and develop a

voluntary plan consistent with Utah law/ and (4) for an order
of the court granting plaintiffs judgment against the Board for
a

reasonable

sum

for

the

use

and

benefit

attorneys, and for costs incurred herein.
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of plaintiffs'

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review on this appeal are as
follows:
A.

Whether the Order denies plaintiffs' their liberty

to control the education of their children, which denial is
contrary to the provisions of Utah Constitution Article I,
section 7;
B.

Whether the Order is unconstitutional as contrary

to the provisions of Utah Constitution Article X, section 8
prohibiting a partisan test or qualification for admission or
attendance in the public high schools of Salt Lake City, Utah;
and
C.

Whether the Order is unlawful because it is ultra

vires the enumerated powers conferred on the Board by former
Section 53-6-20, Utah Code Ann.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The determinative provisions of the Utah Constitution,
and

the determinative

statutes

of

the State of Utah read

verbatim as follows:

In 1988 Title 53 was recodified and replaced by Title 53A.
The section applicable to this action is 53-6-20, which section
as amended has now been designated as section 53A-3-402. In
this brief Plaintiffs will refer to the old section 53-6-20
which was in effect at the time the Order was adopted by the
Board on January 19, 1988.
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UTAH CONSTIT. ARTICLE I, SECTION 1.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law*
UTAH CONSTIT. ARTICLE X, SECTION 8.
No
religious
or
partisan
test
or
qualification
shall be required as a
condition of employment, admission, or
attendance in the state's education systems.
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 53-6-20,
Every school board may:
(1) spend minimum school program funds for
programs and activities for which the State
Board of Education has established minimum
standards or rules under Section 53-2-12.1/
(2) purchase, sell, and make improvements
on school sites, buildings, and equipment
and construct, erect, and furnish school
buildings.
School sites or buildings may
only be conveyed or sold on board resolution
affirmed by at least two-thirds of the
members;
(3) participate in the joint construction
or operation of a school attended by
children in the district and children
residing in adjoining districts either
within or outside the state. The agreement
for joint operation or construction of a
school shall be signed by the president of
the board of each participating district,
include a mutually agreed upon pro rata
cost, and be filed with the State Board of
Education;
(4) establish,
locate,
and
maintain
kindergarten, elementary, secondary, and
vocational schools.
Children seeking to
enter school must be at least five years of
age before September 2, of the year in which
admission is sought;
(5) establish and support school libraries
and authorize, and pay for out of district
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funds, a compilation of the history of the
district;
(6) collect damages for the loss, injury,
or destruction of school property;
(7) engage in guidance and counseling
services for children and their parents
prior to enrollment of the children in
school;
(8) apply for, receive, and administer
funds made available through the programs of
the Federal Government. Federal funds are
not considered funds within the school
district budget under chapter 20 of Title
53 •
Federal funds are expended for the
purposes for which they are received and are
accounted for by the Board.
(9) organize school safety patrols and
adopt rules under which the patrols promote
student safety.
A student appointed to a
safety patrol shall be age 11 or over, or
age ten or over in elementary schools that
do not include a sixth grade, and shall have
written
parental
consent
for
the
appointment.
Safety patrol members shall
not direct vehicular traffic or be stationed
in the portion of the highway intended for
vehicular traffic use. No liability shall
attach either to the school district, the
board of education, an individual board
member, a parent of a safety patrol member,
an
authorized
volunteer
assisting
the
program, or other school authority by virtue
of
the
organization,
maintenance,
or
operation of a school safety patrol;
(10) on its own behalf, or on behalf of an
educational institution for which the board
is the direct governing body, accept private
grants, loans, gifts, endowments, devises or
bequests which are made for educational
purposes.
These contributions are not
subject to appropriation by the Legislature;
(11) appoint and fix the compensation of a
compliance officer to issue citations for
violations of Subsection 76-10-105(2).
A
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person may not be appointed to serve as a
compliance officer without the person's
consent.
A teacher or student may not be
appointed as a compliance officer.
(12) adopt bylaws and rules for its own
procedures/
(13) make and enforce rules necessary for
the control and management of the district
schools. All board rules and policies shall
be in writing, filed, and referenced for
public access; and
(14) do all things necessary for the
maintenance, prosperity, and success of the
schools and the promotion of education.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs,

acting

for

themselves

and

all

others

similarly situated, commenced this class action on March 4,
1988 to nullify the effect of the Order, which Order became
effective

in

August

1988. Pursuant

to

the

Order

certain

children of plaintiffs and other high school students residing
in Salt Lake City, Utah are denied access to the Salt Lake City
high school of their choice and located in their respective
neighborhoods, and are transported by school bus each school
day from the area served by the high school in their respective
neighborhoods to another high school not in closest proximity
to where they reside.
The Board admits that the students residing in the
various neighborhoods denied access to the high school of their
choice and closest to them, were selected for assignment and
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transport to another high school in Salt Lake City because of
their ethnic status, their academic achievement scores and the
socio-economic classes of the parents and students involved.
However, the Board contends that under Utah law the Board has
the plenary power to adopt and enforce the Order regardless of
its reasons for determining which student was selected for
mandatory assignment to which high school.
Although

originally

filed

in

the

Third

Judicial

District Court of Salt Lake County, because of the federal
predicates described in the complaint, the Board removed the
case to the United States District Court for the District of
Utah.
dismiss

Following consideration there of the Board's motion to
or

in

the

alternative

for

summary

judgment,

and

plaintiffs" cross-motion for summary judgment, the Honorable
Judge David K. Winder dismissed all federal claims but refused
to rule on plaintiffs1 claims grounded on the Utah Constitution
and other Utah state law.

Upon the federal court's remand to

the District Court of Salt Lake County, and after considering
the parties cross-motions for summary judgment, the Honorable
Scott Daniels granted the Board's motion for summary judgment
and denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

Summary

judgment to that effect was entered on December 30, 1988, from
which summary judgment this appeal is taken.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is no genuine issue as to any of the following
material facts*

All references in this Brief of Appellants are

to pages in the original papers and exhibits contained in the
record on appeal as contemplated by R. Utah S. Ct. 11(b) and
Copies of the Order and Judge Daniels1

24(e).

Memorandum

Decision are included in the Addendum.
1.

The named plaintiffs are the parents of children

currently enrolled in one or more schools in the District.
(See paragraph 3 on page 131.)
2.

The

Board

is

the

legal

entity

administer the affairs of the District.

created

to

(See paragraph 1 on

page 131.)
3.

Prior to January 19, 1988, there were four high

schools in the District, namely, in alphabetical order, East,
Highland, South and West.
4.

(See pages 643-645, 688.)

Prior to January 19, 1988, the Board decided to

close South High at the conclusion of the 1987-1988 school
year.

(See pages 643-645.)
5.

On January 19, 1988, by a bare majority vote of

four to three, the Board made a formal decision constituting
the

Order,

pursuant

to

which

Order

the

Board

established

attendance boundaries for high school students residing in the
District

who

would

be

attending

-7-

the

remaining

three high

schools, East, Highland and West, during the 1988-1989 school
year and thereafter.
6.

The

(See pages 643-645, 688.)

boundaries

established

by

the

Order

are

"closed boundaries" in the sense that the high school students
residing in the District are required to attend a designated
high school, unless, upon a showing of special circumstances, a
particular
District.

student

is

permitted

to

do

otherwise

by

the

(See paragraphs 22 and 23 on pages 147 and 148, and

pages 739-740.)
7.

The

purpose

and

effect

of

the

Order

is

to

"gerrymander" the District's high school attendance boundaries
so that students represented by plaintiffs are prevented from
attending

the

high

school

of

their

choice,

neighborhood or in nearest proximity to them.

in

their

(See pages 546,

730, 772, 773, 776, 777.)
8.

As a result of the Order, certain of the high

school students residing in the Euclid area in the District
whose places of residence prior to the Order were located
within the West High attendance boundary, and who currently
live within walking distance of West High, are now denied
admission to or attendance at West High, and such students have
been eliminated from the West High student body because a high
percentage of such students are low academic achievers, are
members of ethnic minorities, and they and their families are
perceived by a majority of the Board to be members of a low
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social and economic class of people.

(See pages 651-655, 665,

688.)
9.

As a result of the Order, certain high school

students residing within the area immediately south of the
Euclid area of the District, whose places of residence prior to
the

Order

were

located

within

the

South

High

attendance

boundary, and who currently live within walking distance of
West High, are now denied admission to or attendance at West
High, and such students have been denied membership in the West
High student body because a high percentage of such students
are low academic achievers, are members of ethnic minorities,
and they and their families are perceived by a majority of the
Board to be members of a low social and economic class of
people.

(See pages 665, 667-669, 688.)
10.

As a result of the Order, certain of the high

school students residing within the Federal Heights area and
the Avenues area of the District, whose places of residence
prior to the Order were located within the East High attendance
boundary, and who currently live within walking distance of
East High, are now denied admission to or attendance at East
High, and such students have been eliminated from the East High
student body because a high percentage of such students are
high academic achievers, are not members of ethnic minorities,
and they and their families are perceived by a majority of the
Board to be members of a high social and economic class of
people.

(See pages 648-651, 662-665, 688.)
-9-

11 • The

students

described

in

the

next

three

preceding paragraphs are not within walking distance of the
high school where they are required to attend by the Order, and
each

school day, at extra expense to the District,

such

students are bussed across Salt Lake City to a high school not
closest

or most

convenient

to them.

(See pages 680-685,

704-708, 710-715.)
12.

As a result of the Order, certain of the high

school students residing within the 13th and 17th South area of
the District, whose places of residence prior to the Order were
in the Highland High attendance boundary, and who are currently
living within walking distance of Highland High, are now denied
admission to or attendance at Highland High, and such students
have

been

eliminated

from

the Highland

High

student

body

because a high percentage of such students are high academic
achievers, are not members of ethnic minorities, and they and
their families are perceived by a majority of the Board to be
members of a high social and economic class of people.

(See

pages 646-648, 665, 688.)
13.

The Order was designed to make West High

a

"better school" by denying students residing in the the Euclid
area and students residing in the area immediately south of the
Euclid area, access to West High (their school of choice and
closest to them), while at the same time denying the Federal
Heights area students and the Avenues area students access to
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East High, and the 13th South and 17th South area students
access to Highland High*

(See pages 657-661, 665, 669-672,

688,)
14.

None of the high schools in the District is or

ever has been "segregated*"
15.

(See pages 803-807*)

The Order is not "necessary" to enable the Board

to discharge any of its duties as specified in Utah Code Ann.
Section 53-6-20.

(See pages 617-627, 661, 662, 765, 766, 852,

853. )
16.

The three high schools

in the District still

operating following the closure of South High can operate with
all students attending the school in nearest proximity to them,
and with enrollments that are unbalanced between the schools on
the basis of academic achievement or racial status.

(See pages

661, 662.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The Order is unconstitutional and therefore should

be considered of no force and effect because the Order denies
plaintiffs

their liberty to control the education of their

children, which liberty is protected by the due process clause
found

in

Several

Article
persuasive

I,

section

federal

7 of
Supreme

the Utah
Court

Constitution.

decisions

have

declared that such rights are among those contemplated by the
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concept of "liberty" contained in both the federal and Utah
constitutions.

In the present case, the Order Gerrymandered

the high school boundaries within the District for the same
reasons that have historically condemned Gerrymandering —

the

failure to treat everyone impartially by taking rights from one
group and giving special advantages to others.
II.

The

Order

is

unconstitutional

and

therefore

should be considered of no force and effect because the Order
subjects certain students in the District to partisan tests or
qualifications for access to a certain high school, all in
violation of Article X, section 8 of the Utah Constitution. By
definition, partisan tests include tests that divide school
patrons
one-sided

for

reasons

of

allegiance

and

bias,

prejudice

(discrimination),

other unreasonable

considerations.

Such unfavorable tests resulting in the Order included whether
the students resided in a neighborhood of high or low academic
achievers; whether the students resided in a neighborhood with
a proportionally high or low number of minority residents;
whether the students resided in a neighborhood of a high or low
socio-economic class of people; or whether the students resided
in a neighborhood whose exclusion from a particular school was
perceived to be in the best interests of West High.
III.

The Order is illegal and therefore should be

considered of no force and effect because the Order is not
within the competency of the Board because the Order exceeds
enumerated powers conferred on the Board by Utah Code Ann.
-12-

Section 53-6-20 and the whole Utah statutory scheme governing
Utah's public schools*

More particularly, the Order is not

"necessary" as required by subsection (14) of Section 53-6-20
pursuant to the doctrine ejusdem jeneris; granting the Board
plenary

power

pursuant

to

subsection

(14)

ignores

the

fundamental rights of parents to make reasonable choices in the
education of their children, while granting boards of education
the right to make all of those choices in place of the parents
so long as members of boards of education sincerely believe
that what they are doing is right, which authority in favor of
boards of education effectively disenfranchises parents; the
Order creates an incredible situation which allows students
from e.g., Davis County to attend West High, at the expense of
the Davis County School District, but forces a student living
within walking distance of West High to be bussed across town
to East High; and the Order is the result of an arbitrary and
capricious decision on the part of the Board because it does
not

meet

the

criteria

prescribed

by

Section

53-6-20

and

constitutes Gerrymandering.
ARGUMENT
This case presents a classic clash between the powers
of the State to control and regulate public schools, and the
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individual rights of parents and students who are patrons of
the public schools.

Plaintiffs contend that the Order is

contrary to the "fundamental principles. . .essential to the
2
security

of

individual

rights"

in violation

of

the Utah

Constitution and Utah statutory law.
POINT I
THE ORDER CONFLICTS WITH THE LIBERTY OF
PARENTS TO CONTROL THE EDUCATION OF THEIR
CHILDREN IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION
7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Judge David K. Winder of the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, in remanding this matter to the
Salt

Lake

County

District

Court, held

that

"plaintiff

is

correct" "that she has a Constitutional right to make choices
about how her children are educated,"

(See page 558.) citing

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Tinker v. Pes Moines
Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Pierce
v.

Society

of

Sisters, 268 U.S. 510

(1925) and Meyer v.

Utah Constit. art. I, sec. 27 reads in its entirety as
follows:
"Frequent recurrence to fundamental principals is
essential to the security of individual rights and the
perpetuity of free government."

-14-

Nebraska, 26 2 U.S. 390 (1923).

The nature of the rights thus

acknowledged by Judge Winder must, therefore, be understood as
a predicate to determining if the Order dbrogates those rights
in violation of the Utah Constitution and Utah laws.
Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, announced that there must be
a balance between the powers of the state over public schools
and the rights of the parent to make reaspnable choices in the
education of his or her child:
The state may do much, go very far, indeed,
in order to improve the quality of its
citizens, physically, mentally apd morally,
[it] is clear; but the individual has
certain fundamental rights whi<bh must be
respected. Id. at 401. (Emphasis added.)
The issue in Meyer v. Nebraska was whether the state could
prohibit the teaching of foreign languages as a measure to
promote

the

public

good

by

fostering

a

"mother

tongue."

Promoting purely social goals went too f|ar, it was held, and
offended the Fourteenth Amendment provision that "[no] state .
.

. shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law."
While this court has not attempted to define
with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed,
the term has received much consideration,
and some of the included things have been
definitely stated.
Without doubt, it
denotes not merely freedom firom bodily
restraint, but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire
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useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and, generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as
essential
to
the
orderly
pursuit
of
happiness by free men
•
The
established ^ doctrine is that this liberty
may not be interfered with, under the guise
of protecting the public interest, by
legislative action which is arbitrary or
without reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the state to
effect. Determination by the legislature of
what constitutes proper exercise of police
power is not final or conclusive, but is
subject to supervision by the courts. 262
UoS. 399-400.
(Emphasis added, citations
omitted.)
The doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska was applied soon
after it was announced, on facts closer to the matter at bar,
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra.

In Pierce, a law of

the State of Oregon requiring children between 8 and 16 years
of age to attend the public schools to the exclusion of private
ones

was

held

unconstitutional.

Appropos,

assignment of students to achieve admittedly

the

socio-economic

goals herein, the court declared:
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we
think it entirely plain that the [Oregon
statute] unreasonably interferes with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children
under their control.
As often heretofore
pointed out, rights guaranteed by the
Constitution
may
not
be
abridged
by
legislation which has no reasonable relation
to some purpose within the competency of the
state.
The fundamental theory of liberty
upon which all governments in this Union
repose excludes any general power of the
state to standardize its children by forcing
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Order's

them to accept instruction from public
teachers only.
The child is not the mere
creature of the state; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations. 268
U.S. 534-35.
(Emphasis added, citations
omitted.)
Those propositions were reaffirmed by the modern Court
in Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent Community School District,
supra, and Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra.

In Yoder, Amish parents

challenged state control of the educatio|n of their children,
albeit on First Amendment grounds.

Justice Burger observed

that the case was "not one in which any hajrm to the physical or
mental health of the child or to the plublic safety, peace,
order or welfare ha[d] been demonstrate4 or may be properly
inferred" (406 U.S. 230, citations omitted) and then confirmed
the very rights of parents asserted hereinj:
The
history
and
culture
of
western
civilization reflect a strong tradition of
parental
concern for the nurture and
upbringing of their children. Tnis primary
role of the parents in the upbringing of
their children is now established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition.
If not the first, perhaps
the most
significant statements of the Co^irt in this
area are found in Pierce v. [Society of
Sisters, in which the Court observed (citing
the dicta guoted above). . . .
However read, the Court's holding in Pierce
stands as a charter of the rights of parents
to direct the religious upbringing of their
children.
And, when the interests of
parenthood are combined with a frfee exercise
claim of the nature revealed by tjiis record,
more than merely a "reasonable relation" to
some purpose within the competency of the
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state is required to sustain the validity of
the State's requirement under the First
Amendment.
To be sure, the power of the
parent, even when linked to a free exercise
claim, may be subject to limitation under
Pierce if it appears that parental decisions
will jeopardize the health or safety of the
child, or have a potential for significant
social burdens.
*

*

*

In the face of our consistent emphasis on
the central values underlying the Religion
Clauses in our constitutional scheme of
government, we cannot accept a parens
patriae claim of such all-encompassing scope
and with such sweeping potential for broad
and unforeseeable application as that urged
by the State. 406 U.S. 232-34.
(Emphasis
added.)
We
particularly

submit

that

the

in view of the

same principles
language

apply herein,

of Utah

Constitution

Article I, section 7, which reads:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
Our court held long ago that this due process clause
is so similar to the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, that the
decisions of the federal Supreme Court are highly persuasive as
to the application and meaning of the above-quoted section 7.
Untermeyer v. State Tax Comm., 102 U. 214, 129 P.2d 881 (1942).
Thus, the liberty guaranteed to parents with respect to the
education of their children as described and protected by the
federal decisions cited above and
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by our Article I, section 7,

are the same.

In other words, the Board cannot do in violation

of the Utah Constitution what other goverpment agencies cannot
do in violation of the federal Constitution.
More specifically, the principle articulated by Yoder
in its reliance on Pierce and Meyer easily apply to the case at
bar.

Although here the Board did not decree that the children

of plaintiffs must attend public schools, the Board did decree
that if they do choose to attend public? schools, they must
attend a particular public school not in their neighborhood or
convenient to them. Contrary to the Boardf|S assumption that its
power is plenary, Yoder, Pierce and Mey^r all stand for the
proposition that the Board may enforce a binding decision only
if such decision has a "reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the State."
For

purposes

of

this

Ibidj.

case,

what

is

within

the

competency of the state is defined at Article I, section 7 and
Article X, section 8 of the Utah Constitution and at Utah Code
Ann. Section 53-6-20.

Plaintiffs contend that the Order is not

within the competency of the state as so defined, because, by
the Order, a parent such as the named plaintiff, Mrs. Espinal,
for

example,

is

denied

the

choice

of

a

school

in

her

neighborhood or convenient to her (see her affidavit at pages
529-533), while a parent residing on th£ other side of the
freeway is given that option.
are

denied

basic

liberties

Mrs. Espinal and her children
while
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others

are

protected

in

theirs.

Certainly that is so if the basis for the denial is an

arbitrary

one

—

viz.,

based

upon

racial,

or

academic

achievement, or socio-economic values of others, rather than
the standards set in the Utah Constitution and the Utah code as
being within the competency of the Board.
Mrs. Espinal and her children, and other patrons of
3
the District like them, are the victims of Gerrymandering.
Judge Winder not only acknowledged the rights of parents to
control their children's education, but he also frankly found
that the Order "jerimanded" (sic) the attendance zones of the
District.

(See page 546.)

His decision thus brings into focus

the guestion of whether the Utah Constitution and Utah laws
empower the Board to make such decisions.

It is that guestion

which Judge Winder considered of such importance that it should
be decided, in the first instance, by a Utah court.
differently,

the guestion

do the parents1

is:

Put

rights to

educate their children prevail over the Board's decision to
Gerrymander boundaries to create a social "sameness" in the
three high schools; or do the Utah Constitution and Utah laws
protect

parents

and

their

children

accomplish social engineering.

from

Gerrymandering

to

Gerrymandering, by definition,

The term derives from Elbridge Gerry, Governor of
Massachusetts, who used the method to reshape voting districts
to his advantage in 1812, and salamander, which resembled the
shape of the resulting district.
See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED (1961).
Board Vice
President Boyden explained the attendance zones created by the
Order in terms precise to the definition:
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amounts to an unnatural and unfair taking of rights from one
group and giving special advantages to another.

The innate

discrimination of the Gerrymandering resulting from the Order,
by

itself, is

sufficient to cause this Court to prohibit

(footnote continued)
Q
(BY MR. ROBSON) You used the term
"gerimandering"
school
boundaries
or
something like that. Could you explain for
me what you mean when you use the word
gerimandering or gerimandered?
A
Well, as I understand it, it's a
southern word that came from the good old
boys who were trying to stay in office by
moving their boundaries, and on^ looked so
much like a salamander that it c^me up with
the word gerimander. . . .
Vfhat you're
looking at if you look at Exhibit'3, if you
look at that blue area, that blobk is taken
out of Highland to feed into East to try to
compensate for the brown and green areas
that were going to West because that would
have left East with the preponderance of low
achieving students were that chunk not taken
out. Why is this strip included over here?
Why didn't the line — why is the red strip
not attached to West?
Because there were
too many low achieving students ijn that area
to be attached to West, and they had to
either go to East or Highland. And there
were a number of maps which jicjjgled these
lines around.
I used the term gerimander because if
you look at my voting district it makes
absolutely no sense whatsoever, ind I think
that the Salt Lake City Commission figured
that one out.
State legislatur
all the time. And so our school board used
that kind of precedent, I suppoge, to move
these lines around in a willy-nilly fashion.
They don't follow any geographic boundary
necessarily. What they are designed to do
is get these student bodies that have nearly
the same median equivalent achievement.
(See pages 772, 773.)
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enforcement of the Order as a violation of Article I, section 7
of the Utah Constitution.

Surely, no board of education in

Utah has the unfettered power to deny individual liberties by
Gerrymandering as has been done by the Order.
POINT II
THE ORDER VIOLATES THE ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION4
OF ARTICLE X, SECTION 8 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION AGAINST PARTISAN TESTS.
The Utah Constitution, Article X, section 8 provides:

(footnote continued)
Vice President Boyden then explained that the boundary of East
would be truly "serpentine" if the University area, which has
virtually no students, was disregarded:
Q
(BY MR. LINEBAUGH) So if you take those
six students on Sunnyside and throw them in
with all the students, you have in effect
almost a serpentine description of the East
High boundary, do you not, given the order?
A

That's correct.

Q
In other words, there is really no
contiguous alignment for the whole East High
district other than they line onto each
other, is that right?
A
Yeah. It snakes through the city.
page 777.)

(See

Utah Const. Article I, section 26 reads in its entirety as
follows:
"The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory
and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to
be otherwise."
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No
religious
or
partisan
test
or
qualification
shall be required as a
condition of employment, admission, or
attendance in the State's education systems.
We can find no other state constitution cqntaining the language
of

Utah's Article X, section 8, nor c&n we find any cases

construing the language of section 8*

However, by definition,

many of the students in the District are being subjected to
partisan considerations to determine whether they can attend
the high school in their neighborhood or at least closest to
them.

The

Universal

Dictionary

of

the

English

Language

published in New York by Peter Fenelon Collier and copyrighted
in

1897, close

to the

time

of

the

adoption

of our Utah

Constitution, defined the adjective "partisan" pertinently as
follows:
Pertaining or attached to a party or
faction; biased or acting in the interest of
a party or faction.
According to that same source, the word "partisan" is derived
from the Latin root
divide."

"partitus," which

A partisan test then,

literally means

"to

is literally a test designed

to divide persons from each other.

Whilje plaintiffs readily

agree that such tests designed to divide sphool patrons for the
right reasons, for example, proximity to schools and the affect
of natural barriers, highways, etc., are clearly acceptable,
any such tests designed to divide school patrons into factions,
combinations or cliques based upon biases or interests that
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favor one group over another, are partisan tests and therefore
proscribed by the Utah Constitution.
More currently, The Oxford English Dictionary, in its
1961 edition, defines the noun "partisan" as follows:
One who takes part or sides with another; an
adherent or supporter of a party, person, or
cause; esp. a devoted or zealous supporter;
often in unfavorable sense:
One who
supports his party "through thick and thin";
a
blind,
prejudiced,
unreasoning,
or
fanatical adherent.
This same source defines the adjective "partisan" as:
Of, pertaining to, or characteristic of a
partisan; supporting a party, esp. zealously
or blindly; biased, prejudiced, one-sided.
Similarly,

Webster's

Third

New

International

Dictionary in its 1961 edition, defines the noun "partisan" as
follows:
a. one that takes the part of another; an
adherent to a party, faction, cause, or
person.
. . b. a strong or devoted
supporter; a zealous advocate. . . c. an
adherent
characterized
by
prejudiced,
unreasoning, blind, or fanatical allegiance.
This same source defines the adjective "partisan" as:
2: exhibiting,
characterized
by,
resulting from partisanship. . . .

or

Although our Supreme Court has not construed the term
"partisan," our Court has condemned the arbitrary dividing of
school patrons.

Upon consideration of Utah Const., Article X,

section 1 requiring that Utah public schools be "open," our
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Court prohibited dividing the students 'linto classes, groups
and grant[ing], allow[ing], or provid[ing]| one group privileges
or

advantages

denied

another."

Logan

School

District v.

Kowallis, 77 P.2d 348, 350 (Utah 1938).
The agreed fact is that the Boarc} did, precisely, what
Kowallis held could not be done.
Keith

According to Board president

Stepan, the Order divided

the

students

into groups,

according to race, place of residence, academic achievement and
socio-economic

status,

and

selected

groups

were

denied

attendance at the school convenient to them on that basis,
while others were permitted attendance att the most convenient
school.

(See pages 643-685, 688.)

Restrictions imposed by the

Order plainly do not apply indiscriminately to all of Salt Lake
City's

high

subjected

to

school

students.

busing

or

Some of those

transportation

students are

according

to

the

circumstances of their birth, or whether they are members of a
particular faction or combination within the community (whether
favored or unfavored).
Given the plain meaning of the! term "partisan" as
defined above, the use of the term "partisan" in Article X,
section 8 must be held to prohibit the Order. Based on the
those definitions, a partisan test or Qualification is one
which requires a group of students to meet biased, prejudiced,
(discriminatory),

one-sided

and

admission to a particular school.
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unreasonable

criteria

for

For example, for any group

residing generally west of the 1-15 freeway and generally south
of the 1-80 freeway wanting to go to West High, the Order
imposes

the

following partisan

tests or qualifications for

attendance at West High:
1. Your group can't go to West High
unless it is predominantly non-minority/
2. Your group can't go to West High
unless,
as
a
group,
it
achieves
comparatively high academic scores/ and
3. Your group can't go to West High
unless it is predominantly of a high social
and economic class.
The

partisan

tests

or

qualifications

imposed

on

students residing generally east of the 1-15 freeway wanting to
attend East High are
partial
Order*

(as opposed

just opposite, thus demonstrating the
to impartial), partisan

nature of the

For example:
1. Your group can't go to East High
unless it is predominantly minority;
2. Your group can't go to East High
unless, as a group, it scores comparatively
low on academic tests;
3. Your group can't go to East High
unless it is predominantly of a low social
and economic class.
For

purposes

of

this

case,

a

"partisan

test

or

qualification" is a test or qualification that denies some
students
academic

(regardless
competence

of
or

their

personal

socio-economic

minority

class) the

status,
right to

attend the school closest to them because they are included in

-26-

a particular group, faction or combination defined by race,
academic achievement or their socio-economic status*
that is what the Order does.
schools

Clearly,

Students are denied access to the

closest to them, and unnecessarily and expensively

bussed across town, because they were ijmlucky enough to be
included in a group, faction or combination of people in the
District based upon their race, or because they reside among a
group which scored too low or too high the day an academic
achievement

test

was

given,

or

because

families deemed too poor or too rich.

they

reside

among

Others of the same race,

having achieved the same academic scores, and/or having the
same amount of money are permitted to go ^o the school closest
to them, without the concomitant waste of time and money and
the deprivation of opportunity for required and extracurricular
high school programs, inherent in being bupsed across town, for
no reason better than that they reside artong a group, faction
or combination of people which has been subjected to partisan
tests.

Dividing school patrons for sucih reasons is surely

partisanship in its "unfavorable" sense.
It has been said that if anyone Aries to convince you
of the importance of ideas over the importance of individual
rights, that person is usually talking about his ideas and your
rights.

That the Order was a result of partisan ideas, in

other words that the Order was a result of biased, prejudicial,
discriminatory,

one-sided

and
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unreasonable

tests

and

considerations, imposed by a majority of the Board, is best
illustrated

by

understanding

what

the Order

says

to Mrs*

Espinal and her children and the District's other high school
patrons residing in the Euclid area.
As is clear from the Statement of Facts herein, the
Order excludes the Euclid area from the West High boundary, and
requires the high school students in that area to travel across
town to attend East High.

This, in spite of the fact that high

school students from the Euclid area were previously included
in the West High boundary, and in spite of the fact that all
such students live closer to West High than they do to East
High.
What does the Order say to the Euclid area students
and their families denied access to West High?

What message is

given to them as they are bussed across town to attend East
High?

Any way we look at it, the Order tells everyone that

those students are being swapped for high achieving, "waspish"
and supposedly higher class students from the east side of Salt
Lake City.

(See page 773.)

The hard reality is that the Order says to those
students removed from West High, and their families, that:
You have to go to East High because you are
poor achievers — you and your neighbors
didn't score high enough when we gave the
tests/ and
You have to go to East High because too many
of you are members of an ethnic minority;
and
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We have to exchange you for those rich high
achievers
from the east side because
socio-economically you are poorer and we
have to have more high-class people with
more money at West High; and
You have to go to East High because you come
from families who won't or can't give West
High the "critical mass" of good students it
needs; therefore, what we are really doing
is swapping you for a better class of
families — but don't take it personally; or
Forget about what is best for West High, the
school which has your allegiance and
affection, we are really sending you to East
High for your own good, and every day we are
going to put you on a bus that will pick you
up within walking distance of West High and
will take you across town to East High, and
then after school, on an extra-curricular
basis, you can continue in the worthy effort
of trying to make a cohesive school with
your fellow students, provided you don't
miss your bus home.
By the Order, a majority of the Board has clearly told
these dislocated students that they are being required to leave
West High because they don't have enough educational quality.
Since

when

did

lack

of

educational

quality

justify

the

imposition of biased, prejudicial, discriminatory, one-sided
and unreasonable tests to determine whether students get to
attend their neighborhood public school of choice?
Plaintiffs concede it is uncomfortable to face the
reality of what has been done to the District's patrons in the
Euclid area.
from

the

It makes us squirm, because frankly, the messages

Order

are

terribly

offensive.

However,

as

uncomfortable as such considerations make us, far worse is the
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emotional cruelty inflicted upon the patrons expelled from the
West High

community, their

untenable reasons.

school of preference, for such

The dehumanizing result of the Order is

that it inflicts upon the patrons of the Euclid area the pain
and

bitterness

unembellished
wanted*

that

surely

comes

from

knowing

that

the

reason for moving them is that they are not

At least, the students being moved by the Order from

East High to West High can make the move with the assurance
that they are wanted and that their educational quality is
sought after.
The patrons of the Euclid area became a bartering chip
to implement an idea in the minds of a majority of the Board,
and

thus

they

discriminatory,

had

imposed

one-sided

upon
and

them

biased, prejudicial,

unreasonable

tests,

i.e.,

partisan tests, which tests and considerations are proscribed
by Article X, section 8 of the Utah Constitution.
because

of

their

lower

economic

status

and

Precisely

their

lower

achievement levels, the injury to them is magnified, since they
are least able to afford the consequences of the Order.

That

relatively small group removed from West High (not because they
were viewed as desirable someplace else, but because they were
viewed

as

undesirable

at West High) cannot depend

political process to protect them.

on the

Consequently, they look to

this Court to insure their access to the public high school of
their

choice,

the

public

high

convenient to them.
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school

closest

and

most

POINT III
THE ORDER IS NOT WITHIN THE BOARD'S POWERS
AS LIMITED BY UTAH STATUTORY LAW.
The Board's justification for the Order also fails as
a matter of statutory construction.

The powers of the Board

are enumerated in careful detail at Utah Code Ann. section
53-6-20.

For the convenience of the Court, that section is

quoted here in its entirety:
Every local board may:
(1) spend minimum school program funds for
programs and activities for which the State
Board of Education has established minimum
standards or rules under Section 53-2-12.1/
(2) purchase, sell, and make improvements
on school sites, buildings, and equipment
and construct, erect, and furnish school
buildings.
School sites or buildings may
only be conveyed or sold on board resolution
affirmed by at least two-thirds of the
members;
(3) participate in the joint construction
or operation of a school attended by
children in the district and children
residing in adjoining districts either
within or outside the state. The agreement
for joint operation or construction of a
school shall be signed by the president of
the board of each participating district,
include a mutually agreed upon pro rata
cost, and be filed with the State Board of
Education;
(4) establish,
locate,
and
maintain
kindergarten, elementary, secondary, and
vocational schools.
Children seeking to
enter school must be at least five years of
age before September 2 of the year in which
admission is sought;
(5) establish and support school libraries
and authorize, and pay for out of district
funds, a compilation of the history of the
district;
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(6) collect damages for the loss, injury,
or destruction of school property;
(7) engage in guidance and counseling
services for children and their parents
prior to enrollment of the children in
school;
(8) apply for, receive and administer funds
made available through the programs of the
Federal Government*
Federal funds are not
considered funds within the school district
budget under Chapter 20 of Title 53 •
Federal funds are expended for the purposes
for which they are received and are
accounted for by the Board.
(9) organize school safety patrols and
adopt rules under which the patrols promote
student safety.
A student appointed to a
safety patrol shall be age 11 or over, or
age ten or over in elementary schools that
do not include a sixth grade, and shall have
written
parental
consent
for
the
appointment.
Safety patrol members shall
not direct vehicular traffic or be stationed
in the portion of the highway intended for
vehicular traffic use. No liability shall
attach either to the school district, the
board of education, an individual board
member, a parent of a safety patrol member,
an
authorized
volunteer
assisting
the
program, or other school authority by virtue
of
the
organization,
maintenance,
or
operation of a school safety patrol;
(10) on its own behalf, or on behalf of an
educational institution for which the board
is the direct governing body, accept private
grants, loans, gifts, endowments, devises or
bequests which are made for educational
purposes.
These contributions are not
subject to appropriation by the Legislature;
(11) appoint and fix the compensation of a
compliance officer to issue citations for
violations of Subsection 76-10-105(2).
A
person may not be appointed to serve as a
compliance officer without the person's
consent.
A teacher or student may not be
appointed as a compliance officer.
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(12) adopt bylaws and rules for its own
procedures;
(13) make and enforce rules necessary for
the control and management of the district
schools. All board rules and policies shall
be in writing, filed, and referenced for
public access; and
(14) do all things necessary for the
maintenance, prosperity, and success of the
schools and the promotion of education.
A.

The Board's Powers are Limited by the
Enumeration at Section 53-6-20.

Allen v. Board of Education, 120 Utah 566, 236 P.2d
756 (1951) held that a school board has "only such powers as
are expressly conferred upon it and such implied powers as are
necessary to execute and carry into effect its express powers."
(Emphasis added.)
B.
The

"Catchall" Powers are Limited
Doctrine Ejusdem Generis.
broad

language

of

Utah

by the

Code

Ann.

Section

53-6-20(14), declaring that
(14) (Every local board may) do all things
necessary for the maintenance, prosperity,
and success of the schools and the promotion
of education.
does

not

mean

objectives,

that

such

as

the
a

Board

may

racial,

socio-economic mix in the schools.

act

to achieve

academic

social

achievement

or

The generality of such

language, preceded by a specific enumeration of powers, is
uniformly limited by the doctrine ejusdem generis.
LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951):
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See BLACKS

In the construction of laws, wills, and
other instruments, the "ejusdem generis
rule" is, that where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words
of a particular and specific meaning, such
general words are not to be construed in
their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the
same general kind or class as those
specifically mentioned.
Ricker v. Board of Education, 16 U.2d 106, 396 P.2d
416

(1964) held that the Board's

"broad

latitude" must be

exercised "within the sphere of its responsibilities"

Id. 420.

See also, Logan City School District v. Kowallis, 94 U. 342, 77
P.2d 348 (1938).

In what may be the definitive pronouncement

on the subject, Allen v. Board of Education, 120 U. 566, 236
P.2d 756 (1951) split with Hansen v. Board of Education, 116
P. 2d 936 (Utah 1941) on the issue of whether the closing of
schools was implied by the power to "establish, locate and
maintain" them.

In overruling the holding of Hansen, the Utah

court relied upon the ejusdum generis concept.
763.

Allen, supra at

The Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Chief Judge of the United

States District Court for the District of Utah, has held in a
closely

related

context,

that

"courts

should

read

the

questioned statute (viz., defining the powers of the school
board) in the context
subject."

of other, similar

Downy v. Burningham,

C83-1004J, U.S.CD., D. Utah 1983).

F.Supp.

laws on the same
(Docket No.,

To accept the proposition

that the Board has plenary power, this Court must conclude that
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the Legislature

did a senseless, meaningless

thing by the

foregoing enumeration of specific powers if subdivision (14)
confers plenary authority upon the Board.
C,

"Catchall" Powers must be "Necessary".

The catchall powers conferred by subdivision (14) is
further qualified by the requirement that whatever is done be
"necessary" for the maintenance, prosperity and success of the
schools.

Accepted

maxims

of

construction

require

that a

considered use of the term "necessary" be given its ordinary
and accepted meaning.

It cannot be construed as a grant of

discretionary authority to do anything though desirable as a
societal

end,

unless

necessary

to

the maintenance

of

the

schools.
Significantly,

there

is

nothing

in

the

record

establish any such determination, nor could there be.

to
The

statute requires more than an opinion that the Order is favored
by some.

Even if one accepts that a racial, academic or

socio-economic

mix

is

desirable,

it

is

not

certainly not to the maintenance of the schools.

necessary

--

Both District

Assistant Superintendent John Keegan and Board Vice-President
Steve Boyden categorically testified that the Order was not
"necessary" to any purpose specified at Utah Code Ann. Section
53-6-20.

(See pages 617-627, 766.)

The

plain

meaning

of

the

Legislature thus prohibit the Order.
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terms

employed

by

the

D#

Parental Rights to Make Reasonable
Selections of Schools their Children
will Attend are Preserved by Utah Law,

The proposition that the generality of subdivision
(14)

vests

the

Board

with

sweeping

powers

over

student

assignments, including assignment for purposes unrelated to the
specific

powers

enumerated

in

the

thirteen

preceding

subdivisions, ignores the fundamental rights of parents to make
reasonable choices in the education of their children in the
public school system,

Meyer v, Nebraska, supra, recognized

that:
The American people have always regarded
education and acguisition of knowledge as
matters of supreme importance, which should
be diligently promoted.
The Ordinance of
1787 declares:
"Religion,
morality and
knowledge being necessary to good government
and the happiness of mankind, schools and
the means of education shall forever be
encouraged.
Corresponding to the right of
control, it is the natural duty of the
parent to give his children education
suitable to their station in life; and
nearly all the states, including Nebraska,
enforce this obligation by compulsory laws,
262 U.S. 401. (Emphasis added.)
See also, Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra; Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, supra.
In construing the intention of the Legislature which
adopted Utah Code Ann. Section 53-6-20, and whether subdivision
(14) invests the Board with plenary authority over student
assignments,

it

is

important

to

consider

that

numerous

provisions in Utah law confer rights on the parent respecting
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the choice of what school a child shall attend.

The parent has

the right to select a private school rather than a public one.
Utah Code Ann. Section 53-24-1.

There is a right to attend

school in another district in the State, Utah Code Ann. Section
53-4-16, or to attend school outside of the state, and in
either instance and have the district of his or her residence
pay the necessary tuition, Utah Code Ann. Section 53-4-17.

A

child residing outside the state may elect to attend school
within a state district, Utah Code Ann. Section 53-1-18(1).

A

school board could adopt rules, including rules restricting the
rights of the parent, but only if "necessary" to the control
and

management

of

the

schools.

Utah

Code

Ann.

Section

53-6-20(13).
Further, it is obvious from other provisions that the
Legislature intended that a student have the right to attend a
school close to his place of residence.

Each county must

include at least one school district, Utah Code Ann. Section
53-4-1, and cities of the first and second class may constitute
separate school districts.

Ibid.

Clearly, the wisdom of those

provisions is, as Kowallis declared, that a student be afforded
a school close to his or her residence.

That intent is also

made clear by the provision excusing a minor from attending a
school located more than 2.5 miles from his residence, at least
if free transportation is not provided.
53-24-1.2(b)(iv).
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Utah Code Ann. Section

The Utah court in fact held, in Kowallis, supra, that
children have the right, subject only to limitations that are
reasonable

and

necessary,

to

attend

the

school

that

is

convenient to them:
There shall be provided, for each child in
the state, a school suitable to its
development and training, and as reasonably
convenient for attendance as is practicable,
which school such child shall have a right
to attend, 77 P.2d 351. (Emphasis added.)
In so holding, Kowallis confirmed a school board's right to
charge

tuition

because a

to

a

convenient

residence.

student

from

a neighboring

school was provided

near

district,

the

childfs

It would be incongruous, to be sure, if this Court

now denied the right to attend the convenient school as well.
We

note

that

the

trial

"necessary"1

simply

necessary.

(See pages 1053, 1054.)

means

whatever

court
the

concluded

Board

concludes

that
is

That is another way of

saying that if a majority of the Board sincerely believes that
what they are doing is necessary, then what they do does not
have to pass statutory or constitutional muster.

History is

replete with examples of officials who sincerely believed that
what they were doing was necessary for somebody else, but
history also proves that they were sincerely wrong.
Any

high

school

students

in

the

District,

and

particularly those in the Euclid area, who are forced to go
across town to the high school not closest to them and not of
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their choosing, and who were selected for such treatment for
the reasons admitted by the Board, are certainly among those
disenfranchised students that Article I, section 7 and Article
X, section 8 of the Utah Constitution and section 56-6-20 are
designed to protect from an illegal rule adopted by a Utah
school board.

The decision of this Court in Berry v, Beech

Aircraft, 717 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1985) makes it clear that the
Board does not have plenary power to do whatever a majority of
the

Board

decides

is

desirable,

intentioned the majority may be.

regardless

of

how

well

Construing the Open Courts

clause of the Utah Constitution, and its limitations on the
power of the Legislature, the Court held as follows:
Necessarily, the Legislature has great
latitude
in
defining,
changing,
and
modernizing the law, and in doing so may
create new rules of law and abrogate old
ones.
Nevertheless, the basic purpose of
Article I, section 11 is to impose some
limitation on that power for the benefit of
those persons who are injured in their
persons, property, or reputations since they
are generally isolated in society, belong to
no identifiable group, and rarely are able
to rally the political process to their aid.
What was said in Beech about the limitations on the power of
the Legislature, is certainly applicable to the power of the
Board, particularly given the limitations expressed

by the

word "necessary" contained in the Board's enabling statute.
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The Order Defies Logic.

This Court should also consider the paradox presented
by the Order when compared with the statutory scheme described
above.

The Order creates the anomolous

situation where a

student living, for example, in Davis County could choose to
attend West High in the District on a space available basis at
the expense of the Davis County District, but a student living
in the Euclid area within walking distance of West High could
not attend West High because of such student's racial, academic
or socio-economic
incredible result.

status.

The Order reaches

just such an

Likewise, a resident of the Nevada side of

Wendover has the right to attend any school in Tooele County,
subject

only

to

space

availability,

but

based

upon

the

rationale of the Order, a resident of the Utah side of the same
city would have no corresponding right to choose to attend the
most convenient school in Tooele County.
We can agree that the Legislature intended that school
boards have broad discretion, but not that they run roughshod
over the reasonable choices of the parent in educating his or
her child.

The powers of the Board, we submit, are limited for

the purpose of preserving the correlative rights of the parent,
and the scope of the limitation is indicated by the powers
enumerated at Utah Code Ann. Section 53-6-20.

Those powers are

largely concerned with the establishment of physical facilities
and the conduct of educational pursuits within them.

The

catchall provision of subdivision (14) plainly says that the
-40-

Board

may

do

anything

else

"necessary"

to

the

enumerated

powers, but nothing in that enumeration confers, or implies,
the power to determine what racial, academic, or socio-economic
mix is desirable in the District, nor is such a determination
"necessary," in any sense, to the enumerated powers.
F.

The Order is an Arbitrary Abuse of the
Board's Discretion,

For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint alleges that
the

Order

discretion*

is

arbitrary

and

capricious,

and

an

abuse

of

(See paragraph 43 on page 16.)

Webster defines "arbitrary" as being "based on one's
preference, motive or whim."

A "capricious" decision is one

that is "changeable, fickle, fanciful."

Plaintiffs contend

that, in the context of this case, any decision by the Board is
also arbitrary and capricious if not based upon the criterion
prescribed by Utah Code Ann. Section 53-6-20.

Both terms apply

to the Order which was not the result of natural geographical
divisions, neighborhood alignments, physical barriers such as
major roadways or commercial districts, political subdivisions
or other features that would be considered fair and natural.
The "Gerrymandered" scheme of transporting pockets of
students across the natural divisions to schools not convenient
is appropriately described as arbitrary.

The low income and

minority students south and west of the I-15/I-80 interchange
(many of whom are within walking distance of West High) are
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removed from West High against their will and selected for
transportation to East High —

not because West High lacks

facilities for them or because East High is a better school for
them, and not because they will make East High a better school,
but

to

achieve

a

racial, academic

and

socio-economic

mix

fitting notions of a majority on the Board about how society
ought to be ordered*

Students north and east of the 13th

East/I7th South junction (some of whom are within four blocks
of Highland High) are removed against their will from Highland
High and assigned to East High —

not because Highland High

lacks facilities for them or because East High is a better
school for them, and not because they will improve East High,
but to make room for others who will be arbitrarily transported
even greater distances from other areas of the District.

The

Utah Legislature has neither directed nor authorized the Board
to

balance

our

public

schools

racially,

academically

or

according to socio-economics.
This case is one of the Board assigning students for
reasons not within its competence, as defined by Utah Code Ann,
Section 53-6-20.

Plaintiffs readily concede that the Board

might make reasonable assignments, even mandatory ones, for
reasons of space availability [subdivisions (2), (3), (4) and
(13)], safety considerations [subdivision (9)], availability of
funds [subdivision (10)], or because of personnel limitations
[subdivisions

(7) and (11)], or facilities [subdivisions (4)
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and (5)].

It might do so, as well, for reasons dictated by

natural barriers, or based upon constitutional considerations
such as, e.g., segregation.

However, if schools are to be

manipulated for racial, academic achievement or socio-economic
ends,

the

competence

to

do

so

still

resides

with

the

Legislature, unless and until it has delegated that authority
to the school boards.
CONCLUSION

For
provisions

of

the

foregoing

reasons,

the Utah Constitution

the

and

Order

laws, the

offends
summary

judgment in favor of the Board should be reversed and the case
remanded
summary

to the District Court with
judgment

instructions

to enter

in favor of plaintiffs, including without

limitation, directing notice to the Board of the particulars in
which the Order violates the Utah Constitution and exceeds the
powers of the Board as granted by the statutes of the State of
Utah, and giving the Board a reasonable opportunity to rescind
the Order and develop a voluntary plan consistent with Utah
law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of June 1989.

Kent B Lmebaugh
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellants was mailed, first-class
postage prepaid, to:
M. Byron Fisher, Esq. and
John E.S. Robson, Esq.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this 14th day of June 1989.

Kent B Linebaugh
KBLP655
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARIA ESPINAL, et al.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL NO. C-88-1444

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY BOARD OF
EDUCATION,
Defendant.

The issue to be decided by this Court is:

Does Utah Code

Ann., Section 53-6-20, authorize the Salt Lake Board of Education
to set school boundaries in such a way as to achieve a "balanced
mix of resident high, middle and low achieving students?"

The

issue is a critical one because it delineates the balance between
the rights of parents to control the education of their children
and the power of the state to operate a public education system.
At the beginning, it is important to say that this case does
not

involve

a scheme

discrimination.

to

reduce

impact

of prior racial

The segregation cases from the federal courts

are, therefore, inapplicable.
been dismissed.

the

All of the federal claims have

The only issue at bench is the power of the

school board under the state statute.
The legislature has provided that boards of education shall
have the following powers:

ESPINAL V. SALT LAKE CITY
BOARD OF EDUCATION

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Every local board may:
(1) spend minimum school program funds for
programs and activities for which the State
Board of Education has established minimum
standards or rules under Section 53-2-12.1;
(2) purchase, sell, and make improvements on
school sites, buildings, and equipment and
construct, erect, and furnish school
buildings.
School sites or buildings may
only be conveyed or sold on board resolution
affirmed by at least two-thirds of the
members;
(3) participate in the joint construction or
operation of a school attended by children in
the district and children residing in
adjoining districts either within or outside
the state. The agreement for joint operation
or construction of a school shall be signed
by the president of the board of each
participating district, include a mutually
agreed upon pro rata cost, and be filed with
the State Board of Education;
(4) establish,
locate, and
maintain
kindergarten, elementary, secondary, and
vocational schools.
Children seeking to
enter school must be at least five years of
age before September 2 of the year in which
admission is sought;
(5) establish and support school libraries
and authorize, and pay for out of district
funds, a compilation of the history of the
district;
(6) collect damages for the loss, injury, or
destruction of school property;
(7) engage in guidance and counseling
services for children and their parents prior
to enrollment of the children in school;

ESPINAL V. SALT LAKE CITY
BOARD OF EDUCATION
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(8) apply for, receive, and administer funds
made available through the programs of the
Federal Government.
Federal funds are not
considered funds within the school district
budget under Chapter 20 of Title 53. Federal
funds are expended for the purposes for which
they are received and are accounted for by
the Board.
(9) organize school safety patrols and adopt
rules under which the patrols promote student
safety.
A student appointed to a safety
patrol shall be age 11 or over, or age ten or
over in elementary schools that do not
include a sixth grade, and shall have written
parental consent for the appointment. Safety
patrol members shall not direct vehicular
traffic or be stationed in the portion of the
highway intended for vehicular traffic use.
No liability shall attach either to the
school district, the board of education, an
individual board member, a parent of a safety
patrol member, an authorized volunteer
assisting the program, or other school
authority by virtue of the organization,
maintenance or operation of a school safety
patrol;
(10) on its own behalf, or on behalf of an
educational institution for which the board
is the direct governing body, accept private
grants, loans, gifts, endowments, devises or
bequests which are made for educational
purposes.
These contributions are not
subject to appropriation by the Legislature;
(11) appoint and fix the compensation of a
compliance officer to issue citations for
violations of Subsection 76-10-105(2).
A
person may not be appointed to serve as a
compliance officer without the person1s
consent.
A teacher or student may not be
appointed as a compliance officer.
(12) adopt bylaws
procedures;

and

rules

for

its

own

ESPINAL V. SALT LAKE CITY
BOARD OF EDUCATION

PAGE FOUR

MEMORANDUM DECISION

(13) make and enforce rules necessary for the
control and management of the district
schools. All board rules and policies shall
be in writing, filed, and referenced for
public access; and
(14) do all things necessary for the
maintenance, prosperity, and success of the
schools and the promotion of education.
Utah Code Ann., Section 53-6-20.
In this statute the legislature empowers boards of education
to establish and locate schools.

And in the final clause the

boards are given authority to "do all things necessary for the
maintenance, prosperity;

and

success of the

schools and the

promotion of education."
Obviously, it is "necessary" that boundary
schools are drawn.

lines between

The question is whether in drawing those

boundaries social, economic and racial balancing can be taken
into consideration.

Plaintiffs

characterize this as "social

engineering,," and allege that it is beyond the "necessary" powers
of the school board.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar problem in 1932
when the power of schools to provide extra-curricular activities
was challenged.
School

District,

In Beard v. Board of Education of North Summit
81 Utah

51, 16 P.2d

articulated the following principle:

900

(1932), the court
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The board of education, being a creation of
the Legislature, has only such powers as are
expressly conferred upon it and such implied
powers as are necessary to execute and carry
into effect its express powers.... The court
is not concerned with the policy, expediency,
wisdom, or justice of a legislative enactment
conferring powers on boards of education of
school districts, and where such authorities
act within their powers, in the absence of a
clear abuse, the courts will sustain the
exercise of such power.
81 Utah at 60.
The
empower

statute
boards

activities; but

now
of

in

effect

education

certainly

to

it

still

does

provide

has been

for

not

specifically

extracurricular

accepted

that

school

dances, parties, football games and the like are a legitimate
part of the educational process.

It can be argued that they are

not "necessary for the maintenance, prosperity, and success of
the schools"; indeed
subject

beyond

it may be argued that teaching of any

reading,

writing

and

arithmetic

is

not

"necessary."
The point is:

it is not for the court to substitute its

judgment for the judgment of the elected board of education.

As

the court said in Beard, "the question for determination is one
of power rather than of policy."
When the statute says that the boards have authority to do
what is "necessary" to promote education, it means "necessary" in
the opinion of the board; not "necessary" in the opinion of the

ESPINAL V. SALT LAKE CITY
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The court must sustain the action of the board if under

any reasoncible view the function in question can be considered
"necessary."
The balancing of the student body along social, racial and
economic

lines can be defended

educational
students

process.

get

environment.

a

as a legitimate part of the

Certainly* the

better

educational

Board

may

believe

experience

in

that

such

an

Plaintiffs and many others may disagree; but their

remedy is at the ballot box, not in the courts.
Plaintiffs'

further

partisan qualification
without

merit

in

my

argument

that

the

order

creates

a

for attendance at the schools is also
opinion.

The

plain

language

of that

constitutional provision clearly does seem intended to apply to
this situation.
Defendant's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
that Mr. Robson prepare an appropriate Order.
Dated this

/

day of December, 1988.

SCOTT DANIELS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

is

granted.
I request
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

following, this

Memorandum

Decision,

postage

day of December, 1988:

Parker M. Nielson
Attorney for Plaintiffs
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
M. Byron Fisher
John E. S. Robson
Attorneys for Defendant
215 S. State, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

prepaid,

to

the

